Development economics and radical theories of the peripheral state by Simkins, Charles
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
Pietermaritzburg 
Department of Economics 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES RESEARCH GROUP 
Discussion Paper No. 3 




Development economics and radical theories of the peripheral state 
Charles Simkins 
'The obvious puzzle presented by these proposals 
(contained in the ILO Report on Employment, Incomes 
and Equality in Kenya) is what incentive the mission 
thought all these groups - the heart and soul of the 
comprador alliance - might possibly have for making 
such sacrifices ... What ...would induce the govern-
ment to do in the 1970s what it had not only not 
done, but had destroyed its opponents for advocating, 
in the 1960s?' 
- Colin Leys1 
Leys's criticism of the ILO report on Kenya could be made mutatis mutandis, 
in connection with countless pieces of policy advice given by development 
economists all over the 'Third World'. Conventional development economics 
is vulnerable at the level of policy recommendation because it does not have 
an adequate theory of the state. In fact many economists work virtually 
without a theory of the state as a result of a well-entrenched professional 
attitude about 'politics' based on a faulty chain of reasoning. We may rely 
on Lipsey, author of a widely-used elementary economics text-book to intro-
duce us to the first defective link in the chain. 'The ability to separate 
positive inquiries from normative ones', asserts Lipsey breezily, 'has been 
one of the main reasons for the success of science in the last 300 years ... 
Positive statements concern what is, was or will be ... Normative statements 
concern what ought to be.'2 Lipsey himself realises that the distinction won't 
stand up to criticism in the end, for in the footnotes to the very next page 
we read "Philosopher friends have persuaded me that, when pushed to its limits, 
the distinction between positive and normative becomes blurred, or else breaks 
down completely.' That doesn't stop him and many others, however, from making 
'positive economics' their area of professional concern. Of course, when it 
comes to policy design, such economists need a 'value input' which they regard 
it as the politician's job to supply. An apocryphal story has the head of a 
team of development economists saying to an African president: 'Specify your 
social welfare function and we'll devise a plan for optimising it.' An absurd 
story, of course, but a little consideration of why it is absurd will perhaps 
be instructive. 
We could take a fairly cynical view of the situation and observe that if the 
president is dedicated to the enrichment of a small dominant class by all possible 
means and with no regard for the welfare of anyone else, he is scarcely likely 
to say so. It is always good policy to be publicly committed to goodness and 
truth and beauty and if contemporary taste requires it, let us have development 
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plans based on these 'value inputs.' Everyone who 'knows the score' will, 
of course, make ritual obeisance to such plans, perhaps stressing the attractive 
bits (e.g. the desirability of wage restraint among the poor) and then attend 
to their real interests. In all this, development economists are in a similar 
position to European poets and painters in earlier centuries. In order to 
live they had to seek a rich patron (no matter how dissolute or pox-ridden) 
to whom they could address themselves as 'your obedient servants.' Under such 
circumstances one finds oneself driven to naivete . 
It was the achievement of the good soldier Svejk not to allow himself to become 
confused by the subterfuges he was obliged to adopt in order to survive. Many 
of us do not reach his level of clarity, preferring to explain to ourselves 
in an ethically murky situation that we are capable of being better, truer and 
more beautiful than the situation really allows. So it is that we become in-
volved in ideology (an ideological belief may be defined simply, for our 
purposes, as one which is adhered to on grounds other than its truth, the other 
grounds often being material interest), an involvement it is the function of 
criticism to combat. And since one of the few generalisations one can safely 
make about the 'peripheral state' is that one can expect to find considerable 
ethical murkiness within it, it is as well to be on one's critical guard against 
ideology when thinking about it. 
Perhaps we may exercise our critical faculties a little on the closest thing 
to a theory of the developing state that conventional development economics 
has produced, namely, 'modernisation theory'. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to attempt a comprehensive critique of modernisation theory; instead 
I propose to consider a single fairly recent and influential work in the 
field - Adelman and Morris's Society, Politics and Economic Development.3 
This study considered (initially) all non-European countries (European countries 
were excluded on the grounds of being 'developed' and therefore of no interest) 
that 'as of 1950 or thereafter, were in receipt of intergovernmental aid from 
the United States'.4 A few such countries were dropped from consideration, 
information on them being too limited. More seriously, 'the major exclusion, 
and the one most likely to introduce a bias in our results, was that of the 
less-developed communist countries. The reason for excluding these countries 
was the overwhelming lack of comparable data, particularly with regard to 
various aspects of economic structure.'5 
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Adelman and Morris proceed by assigning values to a considerable number of social, 
political and economic indicators. They then apply modern techniques of multi-
variate analysis to uncover underlying structures in the data. Of greatest 
interest to us is their set of political indicators, listed below: 
degree of national integration and sense of national unity 
degree of centralisation of political power 
strength of democratic institutions 
degree of freedom of political opposition and press 
degree of competitiveness of political parties 
predominant basis of the political party system 
strength of the labour movement 
political strength of the traditional elite 
political strength of the military 
degree of administrative efficiency 
extent of leadership commitment to economic development 
extent of political stability 6 
By and large one rates as 'modern' if one is roughly in the same position as 
the United States (or more accurately, the same position that the theorists 
of what C. Wright Mills called 'The Great American Celebration1 ascribed to 
the United States). For example, one gets an A for degree of administrative 
efficiency if one's 'public administration was reasonably efficient. These 
countries had relatively well-trained civil services and did not suffer from 
instability of policy at higher administrative levels. Corruption was not 
widespread. Finally, bureaucratic inefficiency was not as marked as in most 
less-developed countries.' 'Countries in which public administration was 
characterised by extreme bureaucratic inefficency and/or widespread corruption 
and/or serious instability of policy at higher administrative levels' 7 were 
awarded a C and those in which all three of these phenomena prevailed were 
classified C-. The interested reader, as they say in mathematics textbooks, 
may verify that a similar result holds in other cases. This exposes Adelman 
and Morris to the charge of 'American ethnocentrism', which, it has been argued 
is a feature of all modernisation theory. The result of this ethnocentrism is 
neatly summarised by Hoogvelt: 
'... The continuing influence of this theorising upon development policies 
can hardly be exaggerated. The key to this 'influence lies in the confusion 
of the methodological construct of 'structural compatibility' with that of 
'causes' of social change. Because modernisation theories have viewed the total 
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transformation, that is westernisation of developing countries to be an in-
escapable outcome of successful diffusion of the Western economic/technological 
complex, by methodological reversal it is argued that a reorganisation of 
existing social and cultural as well as political patterns in anticipation of 
their compatibility with the diffused Western economic/technological complex 
may in fact facilitate the very process of this diffusion itself. This monu-
mental theoretical error - which to be fair was not always committed by the 
theorists themselves - has in fact been made and continues to be made by 
modernisation policy-makers such as those employed by Western governments, 
U.N. organisations, the World Bank, and so forth.1 8 
Despite the problems of sample bias and fethnocentrism, it might be instructive 
to look at Adelman and Morris's results on the political front. Methodologies 
which are less than perfect may sometimes yield interesting results (we might 
refer to this as the first principle of 'methodological opportunism'). Taking 
all countries together, Adelman and Morris were able to derive an association 
'between per capita GNP and two aspects of sociopolitical change: the socio-
cultural concomitants of the industrialisation-urbanisation process and the 
evolution of participant political institutions.' 9 In their explanation of 
this finding, Adelman and Morris's ethnocentricity finds perhaps its clearest 
expression: 'The association between more democratic and better articulated 
and integrated political systems, on the one hand, and levels of economic 
development, on the other, probably arises because both the ability to generate 
sustained economic growth and the evolution of more sophisticated political 
institutions require fundamental changes in mentality characteristic of the 
spread of rational thought patterns. The participant style of life tends to 
generate a capacity to adapt existing institutional frameworks to continual 
economic and social change. This malleability of social structure is essential 
both to successful entrepreneurial activity and to effective political modern-
isation.' 10 In the light of acknowledged sample bias, this is indeed an 
incautious conclusion; interestingly, there is a disjunction between it and 
other conclusions drawn. Adelman and Morris divide up their sample into 
countries at low, intermediate and high levels of development. For countries 
at a low level of development they conclude that 'political forces do not 
exert a particularly strong systematic effect on rates of economic growth, 
even though there is a slight tendency for authoritarian governments to be more 
effective economically, ' 11 (my italics). And for countries at intermediate 
levels, they find'politically, the government of a typical nation at this level 
still does not play an especially effective role in stimulating economic 
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modernisation. Furthermore, whilie the mild, positive association that we found 
for countries at the lowest level, between more autocratic forms of government 
and more rapid economic growth, still persists at this level, neither the precise 
form of the political system nor the leadership's attitude toward development 
appears to be an important systematic determinant of economic performance for 
these countries.' 1 2 
Adelman and Morris end up then, with what might be called a 'null result1 even 
at the level of'structural compatibility' and if, as I believe to be the case, 
their approach is typical of modernisation theory, then we see that modernisation 
theory does not get us very far. This is the probable reason for the recent 
drying up of work of this kind. The expanding field at present seems to be 
that of the study of the 'peripheral state' and it is to a study of some of 
this literature that the rest of this paper is devoted. 
Radical theories of peripheral societies start out (though to varying degree) 
from Marxian premises. As Foster-Carter points out, however, Marxists are 
divided over the fundamental issue of the proper characterisation of 'under-
development' itself. 13 We may cull brief descriptions of the major contenders 
from the pages of Foster-Carter's article: 
(i) 'Warren, for instance, argues that the 'Third World'today is at an early 
stage (or various stages) of industrialisation and the development of capitalism, 
precisely as we know these processes from the experience of 'developed' coun-
tries' 14 
(ii) Then 'there is the conception of underdevelopment as a transition blocked, 
a ('normal') process incomplete. This I take to be the sense of Kay's dictum 
that 'capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the under-
developed world, but because it did not exploit it enough' - a fact which he 
attributes to the unduly prolonged dominance in the Third World of merchant 
capital, unable as it is to revolutionise the mode of production' 1 5 
(iii) For Amin, 'the 'blocked transition' becomes 'peripheral capitalism' -
a reality sui generis. The 'normal' development of capitalism (as studied, 
and formally stated, by Marx in Capital) is but one variant ... This is 
'autocentric', based on a dynamic relationship between producer goods and 
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consumer goods sectors and fuelled by home market demand. The Third World, 
by contrast, has from the beginning been extraverted, externally oriented: 
here the key sectors are export production and import consumption, again 
dynamically related but perversely so, and with no prospect of debouching 
into the 'autocentric1 type..' 1 6 
(iv) For Frank, 'capitalism is constituted by a uniform hierarchy of metropolis 
and satellite, expropriating and appropriating surplus upwards and outwards, 
nationally and internationally. In particular ... Frank will have none of any 
suggestion that the penetration of capitalism is in some sense partial or 
incomplete, so that underdevelopment should be understood as a form of com-
bination of capitalism with something else.' 1 7 
(v) 'Against Frank's ubiquitous and homogeneous 'capitalism', Laclau posits 
not a dualistic model (he too speaks of an 'indissoluble unity') but a structured 
and differentiated whole, the 'economic system' - others will call it 'social 
formation' - which is indeed capitalistic ... Laclau ... maintains that there 
were and are substantial elements of feudalism in Latin America. Yet - and here 
is the twist - these exist not exogenous to capitalism, nor as pockets of decline, 
but as an intrinsic and structured part of a wider system. In Latin America ... 
it was precisely the impact of an external market which - so far from dissolving -
intensified or even invented feudal and other precapitalist modes of production. 
We thus have the paradox of capitalism's relation to other modes of production 
being conceived not (or not simply) as succession or evolution (as in the 
'stages' model) ... nor yet as some kind of dialectical transcendence and 
dissolution ... nor even as a transition. On the contrary, this capitalism 
neither evolves mechanically from what precedes it, nor does it necessarily 
dissolve it.' 18 This is the view that has most commended itself to radical 
scholars working on South African history. 
(vi) Finally, it is worth mentioning the old Comintern line that, as capitalism 
expanded in colonised countries, one could expect a conflict to develop between 
national and metropolitan bourgeoisies, the former leading the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution against imperialism. 19 Of all the Marxist positions, this is now 
the least plausible and is explicitly countered by Sunkel's model of 'trans-
national integration.' As summarised by Langdon 'such a model involves a much 
more comprehensive and symbiotic alliance between the emerging indigenous bourgeois 
and foreign capital. The former is incorporated more fully into the international 
capitalist economy, at the expense of non-integrated majorities in the periphery 
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economies. Given this transnationalisation view, neither independent capitalist 
development nor promising class contradictions can be expected from relations 
between foreign and domestic capital.' 2 0 
Again, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide more comprehensive accounts 
of these positions, to identify what is at stake between them or to argue for 
one position against the others. The latter tasks would require both theoretical 
development and criticism and an evaluation of the fruitfulness of the various 
approaches when applied to the study of concrete situations. What needs to be 
observed here is that different characterisations of peripheral economies will 
have different implications for the way in which we think about the peripheral 
state. 
An influential article on the state in post-colonial societies has been that 
of Alavi on Pakistan and Bangladesh. 2 1 In it he advanced two controversial 
theses about the post-colonial state, namely that it is firstly 'overdeveloped' 
and secondly 'relatively autonomous.' These two theses are connected - let us 
take a look at Alavi's formulations and then the criticisms directed against 
them: 
(i) the overdeveloped state: The task of the metropolitan bourgeoisie 'in 
the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it 
had established in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally, it has to 
create state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the 
indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said that the 'super-
structure' in the colony is therefore 'over-developed' in relation to the 
'structure' in the colony ... The post-colonial society inherits that over-
developed apparatus of state and its institutionalised practices through which 
the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.' 2 2 
(ii) relative autonomy: Alavi takes the interests of 'three propertied ex-
ploiting classes' to be dominant in postcolonial societies, namely 'the in-
digenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisies and the 
landed classes.' 2 3 However Alavi argues that these three classes 'do not 
constitute a 'whole', for they have different structural bases and competing 
class interests.'21* Hence the classical position (as summed up by Poulantzas) 
of Marxism on the relative autonomy of the state does not apply to the post-
colonial state in Alavi's opinion. The quotation from Poulantzas is worth 
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reproducing: 'When Marx designated Bonapartism as the 'religion of the bour-
geoisie,' in other words a characteristic of all forms of the capitalistic 
State, he showed that this State can only truly serve the ruling class in so 
far as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse fractions of this class, 
precisely in order to organise the hegemony of the whole of this class.' 2 5 
Yet Alavi himself states that in the post-colonial state the mutual interests 
of the three dominant classes 'are no longer antagonistic and contradictory; 
rather they are mutually competing but reconciliable' 2 6 and it appears to his 
critics that his distinction between 'classical' and 'post-colonial' relative 
autonomy is built on foundations of sand. 2 7 For, in general, it is the 
function of the state to hold the ring for competing dominant classes to adjust 
their interests. This is a view which looks similar to conventional 'pluralist' 
theories of the democratic state; however, Marxists would observe with Schattsch-
neider that 'the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly choir sings 
with a strongly upper-class accent ' 2 8 and would further identify the upper 
class with the owners of the means of production. To make this general obser-
vation is not, of course, to deny that the peripheral state may operate in a 
different fashion from the metropolitan state. Indeed, we would expect it to 
do so if the class configurations differed between them. Hence Leys's dictum: 
'In order to understand the significance of any state for the class struggle 
we must start out from the class struggle, not the state.' 2 9 
It is at the level of class analysis that the greatest weakness appears in 
the contemporary Marxist literature. This has taken the form of an inconclusive 
debate of the role of the petit bourgeois (and especially the state bureaucracy) 
in the peripheral state. This is symptomatic of a deeper malaise in the light 
of a well-established Marxist tendency to use the classification 'petit bourgeois' 
as a default option; if you don't know where else to put someone, you put him 
there. This problem is most clearly seen by Leys who points out that 'Briefly, 
Marx's use of the term 'petty-bourgeoisie' was historically fairly specific. 
It referred to small manufacturers, shopkeepers, peasants and artisans ... 
It was a 'petit' bourgeois class in the sense of being in possession of small 
amounts of capital, and hence having an interest in the preservation of private 
property, and hence having an interest in the preservation of the power of 
the bourgeoisie proper. On the other hands its interests were also opposed 
to those of the bourgeoisie; individual members of this class, however, are 
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being constantly 'hurled down into proletariat by the action of competition, 
and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when 
they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society' ... 
The political consciousness of the petty bourgeois reflected this ambivalence ... 
of a transitional class ... By contrast the word 'petty bourgeois' as used 
by the parties to the debate on the state bureaucracy in post-colonial Africa 
refers mainly to (i) owners of small amounts of non-agricultural capital, 
such as small manufacturers, contractors, traders etc. (ii) the richer peasants 
(iii) white collar workers generally ... The 'petty-bourgeoisie' so defined 
is thus a different concept from that of Marx ... In order to know the real 
significance of any statement about the 'petty bourgeoisie' as they use it, 
we need a general analysis of the development of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction and its relations with petty commodity production, and thus of the 
development of the relations of production and the class struggle.' 3 0 Leys's 
account of the matter is not without its contentious points, however; it was 
part of Bernstein's 'revisionism' in the context of German Social Democracy 
at the turn of the century to assert that the petit bourgeoisie was growing 
rather than declining and that Social Democracy would have to appeal to parts 
of it - in other words, European Marxism has had its problems about the 
approach to the petit bourgeois as well. And although Leys asserts that 
'whereas Marx's petty bourgeoisie played an ambivalent political role corres-
ponding to its contradictory class interests vis-a-vis the developing bour-
geoisie and proleteriat, this seems less likely to be true of the 'petty 
bourgeoisie' as the term is used by both Murray and Shivji,' 31 confirmation 
of this assertion must await the general analysis which he proposes. Von 
Freyhold conjures up a more fragmented class configuration, for instance: 
'Because of the structural heterogeneity of post-colonial societies and the 
contradictory position of most of its non-proletarian classes the post-colonial 
governing class has a much wider range of classes and fractions of classes 
to recruit its supporters from and the policies and actions of the governing 
class may vacillate according to the chosen combinations.' 3 2 In the end 
nothing will substitute for the 'comparative and critical studies' Alavi 
maintains as being 'needed before we can hope to arrive at a general theory 
of the state in post-colonial societies.' 3 3 
All this has led on from a consideration of Alavi's 'relative autonomy' thesis; 
let us now consider the criticisms of his 'overdeveloped state' thesis. Ziemann 
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and Lanzendorfer point out the impossibility of specifying a 'normal relation' 
of state to society, against which post-colonial states can be judged to be 
'overdeveloped' 3** and Leys points out 'the state is equally important in all 
class societies; it is no more 'central' in Tanzania than in Britain or the 
USA (or the USSR).' 3 5 A more helpful approach is suggested by Langdon, who 
observes: 'Certainly the state has a critical general function in all class 
societies - the maintaining of cohesion and domination; but it would appear 
to have a rather particular further function in periphery economies, that of 
managing the meshing of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. 
And that further function makes the colonial and post-colonial state more 
central in the dirett process of surplus appropriation and capital accumulation 
than in advanced capitalist economies.' 3 6 
This point may be illustrated by considering a South African example. Bell 
has given a graphical account of Wolpe's hypothesis about the level of wage 
rates in the modern sector of the South African economy. 3 7 His diagram forms 
the basis of Figure 1. The model, which we shall call the 'Wolpe' model 
(rather than the Wolpe model, so as to avoid the question of whether Wolpe 
himself intended it to develop this way) is 'based on the appealingly simple 
idea that rural income and wage income together must be sufficient to provide 
subsistence, and that the higher is the contribution of the reserves, the smaller 
need be the wage rate.' 38 There is also an 'inverse relationship between 
average reserve income and the aggregate supply of labour available for wage 
employment. The latter follows from the fact that individuals, according 
to this model, do not migrate unless rural income falls below subsistence. 
With a variation in income between individual households, it follows that 
the lower the average rural income the larger will be the number of individuals 
whose agricultural income lies below the subsistence level, and hence the 
greater will be the supply of wage labour. These two inverse relationships 
clearly give a positive relationship between the wage rate and the supply 




Figure 1 - The 'Wolpe' model 
SS' denotes the derived supply curve. Bell regards this model as unsatisfactory 
in part because 'we are not told anything about the nature of the forces which 
come into operation to raise the wage rate in response to a decline in reserve 
productivity' 3 9 and expresses a preference for conventional theory. However, 
the 'Wolpe' model, unlike conventional theory, is capable of explaining structural 
unemployment. To see this, draw in a curve DD' representing the demand for 
labour in the wage labour sector. Suppose at an average agricultural income a' 
with corresponding wage rate w' the same amount of labour is demanded and 
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siipplied, as shov/n. Now suppose average agricultural income drops to a" 
with the demand for wage labour remaining constant. At the corresponding 
wage rate w", a supply of labour 0"S" is available, but only 0"D" is demanded; 
unemployment has therefore emerged. And the point is that there is no 
mechanism for its elimination, which justifies us in calling the unemployment 
structural. Now we know that capitalism made a series of interventions in 
subsistence agriculture whose effect by the early twentieth century was to 
drive down average incomes there. Tentatively, I would say that the critical 
point a' was reached somewhere between 1904 (when the mines' Chinese labour 
policy testified to a shortage of labour in the wage labour sector) and 1922 
(when the Stallard commission reported on the desirability of controlling the 
presence of Africans in the cities, suggesting that more were presenting 
themselves than could be absorbed into employment). Between these two dates, 
of course, there is the 1913 Land Act with its effect of limiting land avail-
able for African agriculture and therefore of depressing average agricultural 
incomes. The emergence of structural unemployment as a result of defective 
articulation (in the sense of 'fitting together') of the 'subsistence' and 
capitalist modes of production called forth state policies to manage the 
'meshing of capitalist and precapitalist modes of production' - the policies 
taking the form of the elaboration over time of the modern form of influx 
control. 
Finally it is worth illustrating the point made that different characteristics 
of peripheral economies will have different implications for the way in which 
we think about the peripheral state. This may be done by considering possible 
accounts of the way in which the metropolitan bourgeoisie exercises its dominance 
over the peripheral economy. A list of Suggested explanations may be arranged 
under two heads: 
(i) power exercised through metropolitan state-peripheral state relationships: 
(a) 'The government of the post-colonial society (is) sufficiently open to 
admit the successful intrusion of neo-colonialist interests in the formulation 
of public policy. Great emphasis 1s therefore placed by western Ideologues 
on the importance of the bureaucracy as an 'agent of modernisation'. Every 
effort is made to influence the bureaucracy ideologically in favour of policies 
which are in conformity with metropolitan Interests. This ideology is expressed 
in the form of 'techniques of planning* and it 1s presented as an objective 
science of economic development.' " 0 
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(b) 'International agencies and aid administrating agencies who vet viability 
of projects, advise or development planning and channellize policies of post-
colonial governments along lines which suit the metropolitan countries. Influence 
on state policy through foreign aid as well as private corruption of bureaucrats 
makes this possible, even when some of the policies are blatantly against the 
interest of the country.' 1,1 
(ii) power exercised through multinational corporation - peripheral state 
relationships 
(a) 'As the erstwhile 'national'bourgeoisie grows in size and aspires to 
extend its interests and move from industries which involve relatively unsophis-
ticated technology, such as textiles, to those which involve the use of highly 
sophisticated technology such as petro-chemicals and fertilisers, etc., they 
find that they do not have access to the requisite advanced industrial tech-
nology. ... For (this) ... they have to turn for collaboration therefore, to 
the bourgeoisies of the developed metropolitan countries, or to socialist 
states. This they do despite the fact that the terms on which the collaboration 
is offered are such that it hamstrings their own independent future development."*2 
(b) 'In the structurally heterogeneous and disintegrated economies of the 
periphery, foreign capital rarely owes its profits to ordinary market mechanisms 
but usually to a monopoly situation which is guaranteed through state action 
granting preferential tariffs, licences and finance, regulating the prices of 
inputs or outputs, providing infrastructure, transport facilities and a cheap 
labour force. Although it is normal in the age of monopoly capitalism for cap-
italists everywhere to call for the support of the state, the services demanded 
from post-colonial states require a much more particularistic interference into 
the economy than is customary in the metropolis.' 4 3 
Whether these explanations are plausible and what weightmight be ascribed 
to each will again depend on analyses of particular cases. Two general points, 
however, are worth making. Firstly, we may note with Langdon that Warren's 
account is undercut in the cases where 'it is not an independent bourgeoisie 
emerging ... and itself manipulating the state apparatus; rather the state's 
symbiosis with the MNC sector gives it institutional independence vis-a-vis 
that emerging local bourgeoisie, while at the same time bourgeoisie remains 
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heavily dependent on the state for its surplus a p p r o p r i a t i o n ' S e c o n d l y , 
it would appear from the candidate accounts just supplied that all of them 
would best be inserted into a theory of peripheral societies with a strongly 
developed 'transnational' emphasis. 
To what conclusion may this discussion be brought? Not, alas, to a neat 
summary of rules for thinking about the 'developing' or 'peripheral' state. 
If modernisation theory has ended up in a cul- de-sac, the road ahead in the 
form of a theoretical synthesis in the field of Marxist development theory 
is still to be charted. I hope I have said sufficient in this paper to 
indicate that such charting will be worth consideration. Indeed development 
economists would be well advised to attend to this project if they hope to 
improve on the ILO Kenya mission's performance in the field of policy analysis. 
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